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A Landmark on the Road to Legal Chaos:
Recognition of the PLO as a Menace to
World Public Order
EVYATAR LEviNE
I. STRANGE "DECISIONS," STRANGER CONCLUSIONS
On December 4, 1975, the United Nations Security Council accorded
to the Palestine Liberation Organization an "invitation" to participate in
its debate concerning Israeli attacks directed at Palestinian refugee
camps on Lebanese territory.' Nine members voted in favor of the resolu-
tion, three opposed (Costa Rica, the United Kingdom, and the United
States), and three abstained. By a vote of eleven to one (the United
States opposing), a similar "decision" was adopted on January 12, 1976.
Both decisions purported to confer on the PLO "the same rights of par-
ticipation as are conferred when a Member State is invited to participate
under rule 37 ''1 (of the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure).8 But as
is clear from the wording and spirit of the resolutions, the Council did not
regard the PLO as a state. Nor, of course, does the PLO consider itself to
be a state.4
Nevertheless, Dr. Anis Kassim stated in his recent article on the ju-
ridical status of the PLO that "the Council's invitation represents a
Dr. Evyatar Levine is affiliated with Tel-Aviv University. He is a Presiding Judge of the
Military Court of the West Bank, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserve, and a member of the
Israel Bar and of its Commission on Legislation. LL.M., 1954, Hebrew University of Jerusa-
lem; Ph.D., 1975, Brunel University (London). Co-editor, Political Dictionary of the Mid-
dle East in the 20th Century (2d ed. 1974). The research assistance of Mitchell Knisbacher
of Bar Ilan University is warmly acknowledged.
1. 30 U.N. SCOR (1859th mtg.) 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1859 (1975).
2. Id.; 31 U.N. SCOR (1870th mtg.) 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1870 (1976). "Invitation" and
"decision" are in quotation marks because the presidents of both meetings were wrong in
declaring the resolutions adopted, in view of the fact that two permanent members (the
United States and the United Kingdom) voted against the former resolution and one perma-
nent member (the United States) voted against the latter. For this and other reasons, it will
be argued, the two resolutions are null and void. See also Gross, Voting in the Security
Council and the PLO, 70 Am. J. INT'L L. 470 (1976).
3. Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council refers to the
invitation of
any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security
Council . . . to participate without vote in the discussion of any question
brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that
the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a
matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article
35(1) of the Charter.
4. See Kassim, The Palestine Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical
Analysis Under International Law, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 1, 3 (1980).
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landmark in establishing a controlling and authoritative precedent" and
that "[ilt is an innovative decision that better served the world public
order by allowing the PLO to exercise its rights by peaceful means and to
reestablish faith in the world organization."'
Is that so? According to rule 37 only a state may be invited to par-
ticipate. Hence, as pointed out by the representative of the United King-
dom, "the granting to the PLO of this exceptional status . . . constitutes
an undesirable and unnecessary departure from the established practice
of the Security Council. The provisional rules of procedure of the Council
provide only for Member States of the Organization to enjoy such treat-
ment."6 The representatives of France7 Italy,' and the United States'
made similar reservations.
The 1975 "decision" was considered by two permanent members (the
United Kingdom and the United States) to be one of substance. They
had voted against it, but the president, contrary to Article 27(3) of the
United Nations Charter, nevertheless declared that it was adopted, 10 ig-
noring the fact that at least its second part was of a substantive nature.
The second part of the nearly identically 1976 "decision" also was sub-
stantive. In that instance, however, the representative of the United
States, while voting and protesting against it, failed to invoke Article
27(3) of the Charter."
In a similar case, in 1959, when the question of Laos was on the
agenda, it was the Soviet Union that protested such a ruling by the Coun-
cil's president. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France had
submitted a draft resolution calling for the appointment by the Council
of a subcommittee to examine certain statements concerning Laos that
had been made before the Council and to conduct inquiries as the sub-
committee deemed necessary."2 The Soviet delegate contended that the
second part of the draft was substantive, but insisted that the Council
first determine a preliminary question, viz., whether the vote on the pro-
posed resolution should be considered a procedural one.11 By a vote of ten
to one the Council decided that it was of a procedural nature, and it was
so declared by the president. The Soviet delegate responded by rightly
claiming that the president's interpretation was illegal; that it was at vari-
ance with the Charter, with the four-Powers declaration,1 ' and with the
practice of the Security Council; and that, for these reasons, it was null
5. Id. at 31.
6. U.N. Doc. S/PV.1859, supra note 1, at 38-40.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id. at 11-12.
9. Id. at 8-10.
10. Id. at 41.
11. Id. at 51-52.
12. U.N. Doc. S/4214 (1959).
13. 14 U.N. SCOR (848th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.848 (1959).
14. 11 UNCIO Doc. 713, U.N. Doc. 852/III/1/37(1) (1945).
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and void.' 5 Moreover, although the president at the 1975 meeting (the
Soviet delegate) stated that "a decision taken by one membership of the
Council is binding upon the next membership of the Council," earlier, in
1950, the Soviet delegate had firmly insisted that "the Security Council
decides in each separate meeting whether to invite members of the Secre-
tariat or other persons. ' 1
7
Nevertheless, Dr. Kassim alleged that the "invitation" extended by
the Council to the PLO is an authoritative precedent and an innovation.
Innovation it is. But one can, and indeed should, wonder what is its legal
basis and validity. Although there are precedents for inviting states and
even "persons" to participate in the Council's meetings - the latter (by
rule 39) only "to supply it with information or to give other assistance"
- never before has an organization been invited to participate on an "as
if a state" basis while not being a state at all."s
Dr. Kassim was not completely unaware of the high hurdles which
lay before him, and his attempt to blindly jump over them was not suc-
cessful. Although he mentioned" that Professor Leo Gross characterized
the Council's action as null and void,'0 basing that determination on pro-
cedural and constitutional grounds," Dr. Kassim either found it too diffi-
cult to follow Professor Gross' analysis or preferred to misrepresent it.
Professor Gross did not say, as one would gather from Dr. Kassim's refer-
ence, that had the Council (in abuse of its powers) "based" its earlier
invitations to nonmember states and/or organizations on rule 37, or had it
clearly "based" the currently debated "invitation" on that rule, then the
"decision" would have been valid and constitutional. To the contrary,
Professor Gross stated:
[Tihere is no provision in the Charter or in the rules of procedure for
'as if' decisions or actions by the Council, that is for the treatment of
a body as if it were a member state; it follows that the action of the
Security Council was ultra vires the powers of the Council under the
Charter as well as the procedure laid down in the rules of procedure
[and that, therefore,] the action of the Council was, legally speaking,
null and void.2 2
Hence, relying-as Dr. Kassim did-on earlier invitations which did not,
and indeed could not, confer the rights of a state on the invitees does not
support his argument, for the earlier invitations were intra vires the
15. See note 13 supra.
16. 30 U.N. SCOR (1856th mtg.) 46, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1856 (1975).
17. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1946-1951, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/
1, Case 93, at 131-32 (1954).
18. U.N. Doc. S/PV.1870, supra note 2, at 11; U.N. Doc. S/PV.1859, supra note 1, at 3.
19. Kassim, supra note 4, at 30.
20. Gross, supra note 2, at 479.
21. Id. at 477.
22. Id. at 479. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCEPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 538 (1966),
for a discussion of ultra vires decisions of international organizations.
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Council's powers. Dr. Kassim claimed that the Council's prior practice
was "not homogeneous," which may be true, but he brought no example
of any case in which a non-state invitee was accorded the rights of partic-
ipation reserved to states. Homogeneity may be relevant in determining
the precedential effect of past practice, but ultra vires decisions can never
serve as precedents, regardless of how many times they may be repeated.
The problem of constitutionality with regard to the Council's "deci-
sion" was hardly touched upon by Dr. Kassim. Not only did he ignore the
assertion put by Professor Gross that the "decision" was ultra vires the
Council's powers, but he ignored the argument that the "decision" had, as
mentioned above, two different parts: (1) a technical invitation that
would normally be procedural, and (2) the portion which accorded the
PLO "as if a state" powers, which was substantive. The Council's presi-
dent was, therefore, acting ultra vires in stating that it was adopted, since
the negative vote of a permanent member had been cast. Although Article
27(3) of the Charter was not expressly invoked in the second case, it still
applies. Neither decision can be considered binding.
II. "RECOGNITION" V. STATUS
The "invitation" was but one link in an ostensible chain of proofs
brought by Dr. Kassim to support his allegation that the PLO has gained
"the status of a participant in international law."' 3 "Recognition" of the
PLO by states and international organizations was, he argued, also part of
the chain. That "recognition," extended to the PLO as a "territorial pub-
lic body" (a term specially created by him for the purpose) is, he wrote,
"reminiscent of recognition accorded to a new government as traditionally
characterized by international law.' 4 He also discussed the PLO's possi-
ble status as a government-in-exile.25
There was much confusion in Dr. Kassim's arguments stemming in
part, it would seem, from the lack of the classical and vital distinction
between the political and legal facets of recognition. According to Profes-
sor Kelsen:
The legal act of recognition must in principle be distinguished from
the political act of recognition. The first act ... is the establishment
of the fact that an individual or a body of individuals is actually the
government of a state. The second act is the declaration of willingness
to enter into mutual relations with this government. A goveriment,
according to the norms of international law, is the individual or body
of individuals which by virtue of the effective constitution of a state,
represents the state in its relations with other states, i.e., is competent
to act on behalf of the state in its relations with the community of
states .... A state is ... free to enter or refuse to enter into political
and other relations with a government, that is, it may grant or refuse
23. Kassim, supra note 4, at 32-33.
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id.
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to grant the government political, but never legal, recognition."
Perhaps the basic elements of recognition should be reviewed. First,
from the legal side, the act is declaratory. But, as Professor Kelsen
pointed out, the decision to enter into political relations, (that is, ac-
cepting a government as the representative of a state, not, of the people
concerned), lies solely within the discretion of the recognizing state.1 The
result is that while the acts of an unrecognized government may be ac-
corded respect as sovereign acts by the courts of a non-recognizing state
or an international tribunal, the unrecognized government does not enjoy
a separate existence under the law of the non-recognizing state, and has
often been held by courts not to enjoy the power to bring a claim.'8 Dr.
Kassim's assertion that the PLO had an "undisputed" right to represent
the Palestinian Arabs (not a state) was therefore baseless inasmuch as it
is rooted in the alleged similarity between the PLO as a "territorial public
body" and a government, or a state. Hence, his conclusion that decisions
made by independent states without "addressing" the PLO are "non-au-
thoritative, non-controlling" was also misguided, for there is no obligation
upon states to recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian
Arabs.
Second, statehood is contingent on the body in question's de facto
fulfillment of the criteria for statehood, namely, a permanent population,
a defined territory, a government, and independence (that is, the capacity
to enter into relations with other states).29 Had the PLO fulfilled each
and everyone of these criteria then all states, including those which do
not recognize it, would be required to respect its rights under interna-
tional law as an independent state. Thus, for example, a non-recognizing
state would be forbidden to threaten or use force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of the non-recognized state in viola-
tion of Article 2(4) of the Charter. But the PLO does not fulfill these
criteria. It is not in possession and control of a defined territory, and it
does not exercise the powers and authority of an effective government. In
26. Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM. J.
INT'L L. 605, 614-15 (1941).
27. See, e.g., I. BEOWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (2d ed. 1973);
C. DEVISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (Corbett trans.
1968); D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (2d ed. 1970); Borchard, Recognition and
Non-Recognition, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 108, 111 (1942).
28. See, e.g., Wulfsohn v. Russian Soc. Fed. Sov. Rep., 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24
(1923); The Tinoco Claims Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1920), reprinted in 1 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 369 (1948), 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924). See generally T. CHEN, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 135-39 (1951); RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 390-91 (1965).
29. See, e.g., Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933,
49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 U.N.T.S. 19; J. BRIRLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 137 (6th ed.
H. Waldock 1963); I. BROWNLtE, supra note 27, at 74-77; The PLO lacks at least two of the
prerequisites upon which there is virtual unanimity among commentators: control over terri-
tory and effective government. There is also considerable controversy as to whether the
PLO could establish a sufficient connection to a permanent population.
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view of the maverick support of the West Bank population that con-
stantly moves from Jordan to the PLO and back (often under threats and
violence, including murders committed by the PLO against dissidents or
pro-Jordanian West Bankers), and in view of the fact that most of this
population hold Jordanian passports and willingly give allegiance to King
Hussein, it is at least dubious whether the PLO fulfills the criterion of
"permanent population." Finally, "independence" is also lacking, not
only because of what has just been said, but also because Israel has exer-
cised full and exclusive control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
since 1967.
III. A TWIsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE "TERRITORIAL PUBLIC BODY"
Dr. Kassim resorted to an "institution" especially created by him for
the occasion: the "territorial public body." Such entities, according to Dr.
Kassim, "include territorial units the elites of which are in the process of
consolidating their respective nation state units." 0 This brought to mind
the United Nations resolutions he cited, but he extended the concept
much further by contending that "[tihe "target authority. . . of an irre-
dentist elite [constituting a 'territorial public body'... may be either a
national or a foreign (colonial or occupying) government."' He ignored
the well known fact that the United Nations General Assembly has con-
sistently limited its resolutions to "alien," "foreign," or "colonial" domi-
nation, insisting on excluding national governments like Israel's.32 Dr.
Kassim, however, included them, thus being directly at odds with the
general rule of international law, repeatedly reaffirmed by such resolu-
tions, that states must refrain from intervention in international conflicts
within other states. 8  What makes these bodies territorial, according to
Dr. Kassim, is the fact that "the revolutionary elite draws its major pow-
ers from the territorial population it claims to represent." And he
brought evidence to corroborate the argument, namely, that some such
institutions and communities have received various degrees of recognition
as subjects of international law. However-and this is the major flaw in
his thesis-he brought no evidence to support his implicit converse pro-
30. Kassim, supra note 4, at 9.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2649, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 73, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970); G.A. Res. 2787, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 82, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A.
Res. 3246, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 87, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A. Res. 31/91, 31
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 42, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
33. See, e.g., Essentials of Peace, G.A. Res. 290, U.N. Doc. Res. A/1251, at 13 (1949);
Peace through Deeds, G.A. Res. 380, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950); Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 14) 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); Declaration of Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970); Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31)
142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
34. Kassim, supra note 4, at 9.
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position, that any body which he characterizes as a "territorial public
body" is entitled to such recognition. Moreover, there is hardly any re-
semblance between the bodies Dr. Kassim used as examples and the
PLO. The movements mentioned by him all controlled parts of the rele-
vant territory. 8 Dr. Kassim asserted that the Vietcong were in full con-
trol of the South Vietnamese population while United States forces were
in full control of the territory of South Vietnam. He also cited the exam-
ples of the Algerian Liberation Front and the French forces." But he was
mistaken here too. Each of the movements had effective control of large
parts of the territory in which and for which it fought. In the case of
Algeria there was even an official map, issued by the French Government,
that showed the zones which were controlled by the "Front. 8 7 The cases
of the American Civil War and the American, Cuban and Iranian Revolu-
tions"8 are also completely different from that of the PLO.
Hence, Dr. Kassim's claim that the PLO is entitled to recognition,
despite the fact that it does not control any part of Palestine, is without
precedent.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE UNFOUNDED PROPOSITION:
DE FACTO RECOGNITION
Whether one considers states, international organizations, govern-
ments-in-exile, or belligerent communities as bodies sometimes entitled
to de facto recognition, the PLO simply lacks the prerequisites.8 ' As dis-
cussed earlier, the PLO is not a state and does not claim to be one. Inter-
national organizations are composed of states; by distinguishing "territo-
rial" from "non-territorial public bodies" and rightly placing
international organizations in the latter category, Dr. Kassim implicitly
acknowledged that the PLO is not entitled to personality as such an
organization.
The status of a government-in-exile depends on the "legal condition
of the community it claims to represent, which may be a state, a belliger-
ent community, or a non-self-governing people."4 In and of itself a gov-
ernment-in-exile enjoys no legal status. ' The Palestinians are spread all
over the Middle East-including approximately one million in the inde-
pendent state of Jordan, which is also part of Palestine. What is the legal
35. Id. at 9 n.36.
36. Meyrowitz, The Law of War in the Vietnamese Conflict, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 516, 530 (R. Falk ed. 1969).
37. M. BEDJAOUI, LAW AND THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION 38-45, 78, 40-41 (Map) (1961).
38. Kassim, supra note 4, at 9 n.36.
39. There are also other recognized or asserted subjects of international law which need
not be considered here, for Dr. Kassim neither explicitly nor implicitly argues that the PLO
should be so classified. These include self-governing territories, trust territories, and partic-
ularly in recent years, individuals. See generally, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
249-66 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Sorensen]; Lauterpacht, The Subjects of
the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. REv. 438 (1947), 64 L.Q. REv. 97. (1948).
40. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 27, at 68.
41. Sorensen, supra note 39, at 290.
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condition of this community? This need not be discussed in this article
because all the governments-in-exile offered by Dr. Kassim as examplesi
represented occupied countries as absentee sovereigns, and their acts had
no force or effect inside their home countries.4
Who is the sovereign of the West Bank? It is enough for the purposes
of this article to say that the question is debatable. Jordan claims to be
that sovereign, and for nineteen years, from the establishment of Israel in
1948 until the Six-Day War of 1967, Jordan exercised effective control
under a claim of annexation. The vast majority of the population of the
West Bank held Jordanian passports during this time, unlike the inhabi-
tants of the Gaza Strip who were denied Egyptian passports while Egypt
occupied that land. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as well as
the Camp David Accords refer to Jordan as a potential party to a peace
agreement with Israel without making any reference to the PLO. Israel,
on the other hand, claims that she has a better title to the West Bank
than does Jordan, and some prominent scholars support this view." But
all this is practically immaterial. The PLO has decided not to claim the
status of a government-in-exile. In view of that decision, Dr. Kassim's
proposition that the PLO be treated as a quasi-government-in-exile is
both legally meaningless and factually foundless.
Nor does the last possibility, that of a belligerent community, solve
Dr. Kassim's problem. He referred to "anticolonial liberation move-
ments," apparently assuming that all such institutions are subjects of in-
ternational law.45 Dr. Kassim did not employ the term "national libera-
tion movement" at all; rather, he discussed "insurgents recognized as
belligerents" or belligerent communities. 46
According to international law the following are the criteria for at-
taining the status of a belligerent community: (1) the belligerents must
control a substantial portion of territory; (2) they must conduct hostilities
in accordance with the laws of war; and (3) there must exist an armed
conflict of a general nature.' 7 The PLO satisfies none of these criteria.
First, as was already pointed out, the PLO has never controlled any por-
42. Kassim, supra note 4, at 10, 28.
43. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 834 (2d ed. 1962).
44. J. STONE, No PEACE, No WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1969); Rostow, Palestinian Self-
Determination, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORDER 147 (1979).
45. Kassim, supra note 4, at 11.
46. The difference between belligerency and unrecognized belligerency, or insurgency,
has been characterized as the distinction between the "recognition of war in a material sense
and the existence of war in a legal sense." The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897). Lauter-
pacht, cited by Dr. Kassim at 11 n.48, has acknowledged that insurgency "does not confer a
formal status" and that its "recognition" does not go beyond what has actually and ex-
pressly been conceded. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 275 (1947).
See also Sorensen, supra note 39, at 288-89.
47. Sorensen, supra note 39, at 264; Kelsen, supra note 26, at 616; G. VON GLAIN, LAW
AMONG NATIONS 552 (2d ed. 1965); H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OP INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 n.15
(8th ed. Dana 1866).
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tion of the territory which constituted "Palestine." It is apparently for
this reason that Dr. Kassim's analysis of the juridical status of the PLO
was based on lex ferende rather than lex lata. To avoid acknowledging
the legal consequences of the PLO's inability to establish itself on a piece
of territory, Dr. Kassim invented the term "territorial public body."
Rather than employ the accepted international law test of effective con-
trol, he characterized a public body as "territorial" when it "claims to
represent" a "territorial population.' 4 By that standard, virtually any
"revolutionary elite" which identifies with a given population could qual-
ify for "territorial public body" status. Examples would include the
United States-based Estonian government-in-exile; the government of
Taiwan vis-d-vis its claims to mainland China; or the relatives and associ-
ates of the former Shah of Iran. Were the law as Dr. Kassim would like it
to be, with states being required to accord legal status to any self-de-
clared group which claims territory but exercises no effective control, the
consequences for the international legal order would be far-reaching and
potentially devastating.
Second, the PLO has repeatedly failed to conduct itself in accordance
with even the most basic principles of the laws of war. Its units have
engaged in airplace hijackings, the taking of non-combatants as hostages,
the indiscriminate murder of non-combatants, and innumerable terrorist
bombings of civilian installations such as open marketplaces.' 9 Such ac-
tions violate, inter alia, principles established by the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.50 There is no need to explain
why the third criterion of belligerent community status is also not met by
the PLO.
The PLO thus enjoys no greater claim to belligerent community sta-
tus than it does to statehood, Dr. Kassim notwithstanding. The organiza-
tion has not satisfied the requirements for entitlement to de facto status
as a subject of international law, and it does not enjoy any rights other
than those which states voluntarily elect to accord it under municipal law.
States which choose not to accord recognition to the PLO are not violat-
ing any international obligation, and their decision not to deal with the
organization, either because of its territorist activities or for other rea-
sons, has no effect on their other international obligations.
Itshould be emphasized that those states which have chosen not to
accord the PLO any recognition are following a practice long accepted
with respect to the recognition of new governments. Recognition is fre-
quently withheld until the government to be recognized has shown a will-
48. Kassim, supra note 4, at 9.
49. See generally J. LAFFIN, FEDAYEEN: THE ARAB-IsRAELI DMEMMA (1973); Z. SCHIFF &
R. ROTHSTEIN, FEDAVEEN (1972).
50. (Fourth) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts. 3, 34; Regulations Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Hague Convention (No. IV), Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, arts. 25, 46.
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ingness to comply with the obligations imposed upon states by interna-
tional law. 1 The PLO has not done this; rather, it has repeatedly
advocated the resort to violence, as shown by Article 9 of its National
Covenant: "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it
is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. . . ." The leaders of
the PLO speak of the destruction of the occupying country [Israeli,5' of
"raising the flag of the revolution by means of the rifle" only,53 and of
"machine guns and rifle bullets" as "the only way to reach understanding
with the Zionist enemy."" This is perhaps why Dr. Kassim found it nec-
essary to engage in an uphill struggle to convince the reader that the
PLO, although not claiming to be a government, should be treated as
such. It has, so he argued, "governmental authority" which expresses it-
self in war situations, in extradition powers, and in taxation authority.5
As to the exercise of "sovereign" powers over Palestinians in war sit-
uations, Dr. Kassim referred to two irrelevant agreements: the 1969
Cairo agreement between the PLO and Lebanon and the 1970 agreement
between the PLO and Jordan." There is nothing in these agreements to
prove that the PLO really exercises powers over Palestinians-certainly
not "sovereign" powers. Lebanon never surrendered its sovereignty over
any part of its territory to the PLO. It is no wonder that Dr. Kassim, in
order to support his proposition, felt required to omit any reference to
Article 13 of the Cairo Agreement. That provision read: "Lebanese au-
thorities will continue to exercise their complete prerogatives and respon-
sibilities in all regions of Lebanon and under all circumstances." To as-
sume that Jordan had waived any of its rights in favor of the PLO is
simply absurd. Dr. Kassim informed the reader the "PLO institutions"
were granted "complete freedom," that "the civil and military sources of
Jordan were to be utilized to save the cause of the Palestinian liberation,"
and that "no authority would intervene against any member of the Pales-
tine Revolutionary Forces or interfere in their affairs under any circum-
stances." He then concludes "the PLO achieved the exercise of nearly all
governmental powers.' 7 Perhaps he is simply unaware of the fact that
the PLO units which were forcibly evicted from Jordan during the 1970-
1971 fighting were not permitted to return in the years that follows. Pal-
estinian operations from Jordan into Israel have been virtually non-exis-
tent for the past decade, notwithstanding the paper commitments which
may have been made. King Hussein did not even meet with Yasser Arafat
51. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 27, at 140; C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-62 (3rd
ed. 1948).
52. Rafik Natasha, PLO representative in Saudi Arabia, quoted by Saudi Arabian News
Agency, June 9, 1980.
53. Yassir Arafat, quoted by The Voice of Palestine (Beirut), June 16, 1980.
54. Abu Jihad, id., May 3, 1980.
55. Kassim, supra note 4, at 22-25.
56. Id. at 23. On the PLO's status in Jordan in 1970-1971, see E. O'BALLANCE, ARAB
GUERILLA POWER 161-90 (1973).
57. Id.
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from 1971 until 1977, must less permit him to direct any Palestinian exer-
cise of "governmental authority."
As for the 1978 accord between the PLO and Jordan cited by Dr.
Kassim,58 more recent events, particularly the appointment of a special
government minister for Palestinian Affairs, have indicated that the
Jordanian Government still views itself, against the vehement protests of
the PLO, as the authority responsible for Palestinians on the West
Bank." Thus Jordan rescinded, for all practical purposes, its consent to
have the Palestinians represented solely by the PLO. Jordan's actions in-
dicate that, as former occupier of the West Bank, it continues to assert
the power to give the PLO a power of attorney or to withdraw it at will.
However, let us suppose that both Lebanon and Jordan were to grant
certain powers to the PLO. This would still not meet the requirement
that the "government" seeking legal status enjoy the habitual obedience
of the bulk of the population. Not only must the "government" itself be
the source of power, but the population referred to must also be that of
the relevant territory, namely, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip-not
Lebanon and not Jordan.
As to taxation, it is hard to understand how the fact that a certain
government agrees to collect taxes for the PLO can be asserted as proof
that the latter enjoys "governmental authority." Dr. Kassim's extradition
argument is likewise faulty. It amounts merely to stating that while there
was no extradition treaty between the PLO and the Arab states to which
he referred, those states decided ex gratia to answer two isolated extradi-
tion requests made by the PLO.
V. A SUCCESSOR TO TERRORISM?
It is no wonder, in view of the analysis hitherto made, that Dr. Kas-
sim found himself compelled to resort to another argument: "The PLO"
he wrote, "is the legitimate successor to the Arab Higher Committee and
subsequently to the Government of All Palestine." He explains that the
Arab Higher Committee (AHC) "was a self-proclaimed entity claiming
the authority of representing a well defined territorial community: the
Palestinian People. . . . The Committee thus met all the juridical re-
quirements necessary for qualifying it as a territorial public body."'
Let us begin with the facts. The AHC was the organization of the
Palestinian-Arab leadership in 1936. It was outlawed for terrorist activi-
ties by the British Mandatory Authorities in 1937 but continued to oper-
ate in exile until it dissolved in 1939. In 1945 a new AHC was formed, in
58. Kassim, supra note 4, at 23.
59. Since 1967, Jordanian ministries-not the PLO-have continued to take responsi-
bility for the administration of various government services in the West Bank, within the
framework of Israel's administration. See generally A. GEESON, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-35 (1978).
60. Kassim, supra note 4, at 30.
61. Id. at 26.
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the absence of local agreement, through the good offices of Arab League
representatives. In 1946, rivalry within the AHC led to the formation by
its dissidents of a rival Arab Higher Front. In the summer of 1946 the
Arab League dissolved the two rival committees and appointed a new
AHC which still retains its formal existence." The Arab League, as is
well known, was established in 1945 by the seven Arab states then inde-
pendent or on the threshold of independence. The Palestinian Arabs were
represented by a notable with observer status. According to the Pact of
the Arab League, member states are bound only by those resolutions of
its Council for which they vote affirmatively."
Dr. Kassim was correct in saying that the AHC appeared before the
British Royal Commission in 1937." It was not, however, invited as such,
certainly not as the sole "indisputable" representative of the Palestinian
Arab community. Although its members were invited to participate, an
invitation was also extended to the Nashashibi opposition.6" It is true
that the British Government invited the new AHC to participate in the
second London Conference of 1946. But it is untrue that it "was received
as the representative of the Palestine Arabs,"" if this is what Dr. Kassim
was hinting at by the words "a similar [to the one inviting participation
at the 1939 Conference] invitation was extended . . . to the Second
London Conference. 6 7 Moreover, the AHC did not actually participate in
the Conference at all "because Britain would not allow the Mufti [a reli-
gious leader of Palestinian Arabs and head of the first AHC who has asso-
ciated himself with Nazi Germany during World War II] to participate.""
Dr. Kassim was correct in stating that in 1947 the United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine asked the new AHC to present the view of the
Arab Palestinians."
What he failed to mention was that the Arab Higher Committee was
not at all times the same body. While sometimes it was the recognized
spokesman for the Palestinian Arabs, at other times it was not. This rec-
ognition was entirely dependent on the recognizing body, which was at
complete liberty to recognize and to withdraw recognition at its own dis-
cretion. The new AHC had been formed by the Arab League, and the
League approved the limited presence and powers of an unelected Pales-
62. Levine & Shimoni, Arab Higher Committee, in POLITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE MID-
DLE EAST IN THE 20TH CENTURY 26-27 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as POLITIcAL DICTION-
ARY]; F. KHOURI, THE ARAB-ISRARLi DILEMMA 24-25 (1968).
63. Levine & Shimoni, Arab League, in POLITICAL DIcTIONARY, supra note 62, at 40-41.
Khouri also writes: "The Arab League Pact had a special section which allowed Palestinians
to participate, to some extent, in League meetings ...." F. KHOURI, supra note 62, at 31.
As to voting in the League Council, see the Arab League Pact, article 7.
64. Kassim, supra note 4, at 16.
65. F. KHOURI, supra note 62, at 26.
66. Kassim, supra note 4, at 16.
67. Id. [Emphasis added.]
68. F. KHOUm, supra note 62, at 36.
69. Kassim, supra note 4, at 16.
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tinian Arab appointed by it.
Dr. Kassim was also mistaken in asserting that the AHC was de-
clared to be the Government of All Palestine in 1948.70 That "government
was established by the Arab League under Egypt's leadership, 7 ' and al-
though Dr. Kassim rightly mentioned that five Arab states and Afghani-
stan accorded it full recognition,7 2 he neglected to mention that neither
Jordan nor any other state in the world community recognized it and
that, in protest, (Trans)Jordanian King Abdullah's response was "to as-
semble some Palestinian Arab Leaders .... and to obtain a resolution
... which called for the annexation of Arab Palestine by
(Trans)Jordan. ' '17 This "annexation" was effected in 1950, making Jor-
dan an indispensable party to any steps relevant to the Palestine question
both as de facto, though illegal, occupier of parts of Palestine and as
"trustee" (until 1967). As is known but conveniently omitted by Dr. Kas-
sim, the Arab League, after having objected to the "annexation" and
threatening Jordan (one of its members) with expulsion, came to terms
with the situation. The League decided that Jordan should hold the Area
"on trust until a final settlement of the Palestine question was
reached." ' This decision was never, before 1967, expressly or impliedly
revoked or changed.
It is not exactly clear what Dr. Kassim's purpose was in contrasting
the Jewish Agency with the Arab Higher Committee. He was correct in
arguing that the AHC was a self-proclaimed entity while the agency was
constituted under the League of Nations Mandate granted to Britain.
7
' It
is also true that the agency was, and still is, an international public body
as it was, and is, a body representing Jewish (at first only Zionist) parties
and organizations from all over the world, Palestine included. But the
Agency's locus standi was, as was the AHC's, "subject always to the con-
trol of the Administration" and its recognition as such an agency was for
"as long as its organization and constitution [were] in the opinion of the
Mandatory appropriate .... ",76 The difference, in this respect, between
the Agency and the AHC lay in the fact that the former derived its legal
standing from an international document under the auspices of the
League of Nations with a view to assisting the Mandatory in fulfilling the
international Mandate with which it had been entrusted, namely, the es-
tablishment of a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine. The Agency was
entitled to its standing so long as its organization and constitution re-
mained "appropriate." The authority conferred upon Britain to deter-
70. Id. at 17. The year was incorrectly stated to be 1947.
71. F. KHOURI, supra note 62, at 83.
72. Kassim, supra note 4, at 18.
73. F. KHOURI, supra note 62, at 106.
74. H. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES 40 (1975).
75. Kassim, supra note 4, at 14, 26.
76. Id. at 14, quoting from the Mandate for Palestine Confirmed by the Council of the
League of Nations on July 24, 1922.
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mine "appropriateness" could not, of course, be used arbitrarily and was
subject to judicial review by the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice. The AHC, on the other hand, had no such rights and could, as at
times it was, be deprived of its "legal" standing at Britain's will.
Dr. Kassim asserted that the PLO was the legitimate successor to the
AHC. If this is so, then its rights and obligations as a result of such status
must be identical to those of the AHC. The AHC had no independent
rights and was subject to occasional and limited "recognition." Recogni-
tion may be accorded and withdrawn at will. Dr. Kassim's entire argu-
ment as to succession is without foundation. There is no general succes-
sion in international law,7 only a qualified succession that may occur,
subject to limitations, with respect to states or international organiza-
tions.7 8 Neither the AHC nor the PLO was or is such an organization.
The AHC was composed of the leaders of six Palestinian Arab parties,
and the PLO-following the recommendation of the Arab Summit Con-
ference in Cairo in January 1964-was established by some 400 Palestini-
ans headed by Ahmed Shukairi. These Palestinians claimed, as Dr. Kas-
sim put it, to be representative authorities of their respective
communities,79 but none of them was formally a representative of a state.
The PLO remains an organization composed of several terrorist groups
sponsored by one Arab state or another. For the same reasons, the PLO
did not, and could not, succeed the Government of All Palestine, which,
as was already pointed out, did not replace the AHC. The Government of
All Palestine has never been formally dissolved.
Of equal importance is the fact that in 1964, when the PLO was
founded, "remnants of the old AHC, still led by the Mufti, denounced
Shukairi for seeking a 'fake entity' [i.e. the PLO], arguing that [the 400]
delegates to the Congress [which established the PLO] had been hand
picked."80 Further, the AHC still formally exists and, until recently, had
its own representative in the United Nations alongside the PLO
representative.
VI. STATUS v. REPRESENTATIENEss
It follows from what has been said so far that the PLO is not an
international body and has no status according to contemporary interna-
tional law. Although some states may have granted it permission to open
offices or accorded its employees quasi-diplomatic immunities, no state is
under any obligation to recognize the PLO either de jure or de facto. Nev-
ertheless, Dr. Kassim argued that the PLO has an "undisputed right" to
serve as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. "No authority,"
he stated, "can legally address the Palestinian community without first
addressing" the PLO.6 '
77. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
78. Id. at 21, 166-69, 370-80.
79. Kassim, supra note 4, at 18.
80. R. WARD, D. PERETZ, & E. WILSON, THE PALEsTiNE STATE 41 (1970).
81. Kassim, supra note 4, at 33.
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Without regard to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the
Camp David Accords, Dr. Kassim's argument seems to conceal a latent
threat on the one hand and a prophecy of total failure on the other.
While there is always the possibility that the peace process agreed upon
at Camp David will not succeed, the question we are dealing with is that
of law, not of politics. Let us, therefore, examine the assertion of repre-
sentativeness, which can very simply be dismissed because there is no
necessary connection between political recognition and representiveness.
By recognizing the Republic of China (Taiwan), the United States did not
necessarily "recognize" its government as the representative of the Chi-
nese people. Even if the United States had so declared, this alone would
not have made the Taiwanese government representative as long as, in
fact, it was not. Likewise, the United States may accord political recogni-
tion to a military government which comes to power in Latin America or
elsewhere as a consequence of a coup d'6tat, although such a government
may at best represent the will of a small militant group. And the fact that
the United States refuses to grant recognition to a duly elected govern-
ment will not, of course, make it nonrepresentative.
Recognition is a political act. Representativeness is a material fact.
The political act of recognition means only that the government recog-
nized is accepted as "enjoying the habitual obedience of the bulk of the
population with a reasonable expectancy of permanence" and, therefore,
as representing the state, not necessarily the people governed. 2 As such it
has rights and responsibilities towards its citizens. The statements and
declarations mentioned in Dr. Kassim's article as having been made by
governments and international organizations as regards the "representa-
tiveness" of the PLO may not, therefore, establish representativeness in
fact but may, at most, serve as an explanation or excuse for the political
act of "recognition" that followed.
Moreover, despite the risk of being threatened or even assassinated
by PLO terrorists for "disobedience," considerable segments of the Pales-
tinian population in southern Lebanon, to say nothing of the population
in Jordan, neither acknowledge nor obey the PLO with a reasonable ex-
pectancy of permanence. Several of the terrorist organizations which com-
prise the PLO have withdrawn, claiming that the PLO does not ade-
quately represent the Palestinian Arabs. An example is George Habash's
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. When withdrawing, such
organizations typically proclaim that they will not accept any settlement
which may be agreed upon by the PLO and will continue their armed
struggle against Israel until the Palestine question is "satisfactorily"
solved, that is, when Israel is exterminated.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
For nineteen years (1948-1967) the Palestinian Arabs, through Jor-
dan as their "trustee," were in full control of the West Bank, while Egypt
82. 1 L. OPPENHIM, supra note 77, at 131.
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occupied the Gaza Strip. For reasons known to the governments of these
two states and the rest of the Arab world it was decided not to establish a
Palestinian state. Nonetheless, since its birth in 1964, the PLO has "offi-
cially" struggled against Israel, and evidently also against Jordan, with
the stated goal of establishing a "secular" independent state in "Pales-
tine." This state would encompass Israel, the territory occupied by Israel
in 1967, and the territory occupied by Jordan before 1969. Establishing
this state under the leadership of the PLO-an international terrorist or-
ganization officially encouraged and supported by the Soviet Union-may
lead to the forcible extermination of Israel, a state recognized by the in-
ternational community and a member of the United Nations. The largest
and most important terrorist member of the PLO, Al-Fatah, approved a
political program at its fourth Congress held in Damascus on May 23-31,
1980, which bluntly stated: "[Fatah's] aim is to liberate Palestine com-
pletely and liquidate the Zionist entity politically, economically, milita-
rily, culturally and ideologically."
In view of the above, Dr. Kassim's statement that, with the Security
Council's "decision," the PLO now can exercise its "rights" by "peaceful
means" seems more than hypocritical. Had the PLO really resorted to
peaceful means after the adoption of the Security Council's "decision,"
and stopped its terrorist attacks against Israeli women and children,
Israel would probably have negotiated with it as a relevant factor in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Under the circumstances, Israel, contrary to Dr.
Kassim's view, is under no legal obligation to recognize the PLO as a
"territorial public body," either on the basis of that organization's own
characteristics or its role as a successor to the Arab Higher Committee
and the Government of All Palestine. Nor is Israel under any obligation
to negotiate with the PLO, Dr. Kassim's latent threats notwithstanding.
The Security Council's "decision" to grant the PLO rights "as if" it
were a state is null and void as ultra vires. Moreover, it amounts to an
attempt to acknowledge an organization which openly declares its inten-
tion-contrary to the United Nations Charter and international law-to
be the forcible exterminator of a member state. Anyone who joins in such
an attempt should be aware that it is but a landmark on the road to legal
chaos, and indeed to the total destruction of world order and of the
human values most of us take for granted.
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